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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case was initiated to exercise a forfeiture provi-
sion in a Uniform Real Estate Contract based upon an alleged 
failure to pay real property taxes for· the years 1976 and 1978. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
/ 
In November, 1981, the instant case was tried to the 
court without a jury. The court entered a Judgment of Forfeiture 
and gave possession of the real estate in question to Respondents 
subject to the payment by Respondents to Appellants of the sum of 
$1,000.00. Appellants' motion for a new trial was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants, Christian A. Anderson and Linda P. Anderson 
seek a reversal of the judgment of the lower court and entry 
of judgment consistent with the laws of the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 30, 1975, Christian A. and Linda P. 
Anderson, husband and wife, executed a Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract to purchase real property consisting of a home and lot from 
Dale and Bobby Madsen for a total purchase price of $20,000.00. 
The Andersons paid $100.00 earnest money to apply toward the down 
payment and the balance of $2,900.00 making a total down payment 
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of $3,000.00 and agreed pursuant to the Real Estate Contract 
to make monthly payments of $143.53 for a term of 20 years. The 
contract contained the usual provisions requiring the Andersons 
to pay the real property taxes as found in paragraph no. 11 of 
said Uniform Real Estate Contract. Paragraph fourteen of the 
contract allowed the Madsens to pay the taxes in the event 
Andersons failed to pay and to collect reimbursement for the 
amount so paid together with interest. 
During the term of the contract, the Andersons, whose 
original ties were in Utah County, Utah, and who desired to 
return upon retirement, lived successively in Henderson, Nevada, 
and Santa Fe, New Mexico, and rented the real property in ques-
tion to a third party and exp~nded sums totalling $2,380.00 for 
improvements to said property. 
Tax notices on the property were sent by the county 
to the Madsens for the years 1976, 1977, 1978 and 1979. Appar-
ently, in 1978, the notice was sent to the Andersons by Madsens, 
who then paid the taxes. The reason for the inconsistency in 
mailing the tax notice was not explained at trial. Mr. Madsen 
testified that when he received the tax notices for 1976 and 1978 
he paid them. Nevertheless, he made no demand for payment from 
the Andersons until after he had received the tax notice for the 
year 1979. At that time, he asked to be reimbursed in the amount 
-2-
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of $690.93 and gave notice of default under the contract (Exhibit 
"4"). At that time the Andersons' agent in Utah asked Madsens for 
proof of payment (Exhibit "7"). In response to the request, the 
Andersons received a copy of a check drawn by Madsens to the 
county treasurer in the sum of $690.93 and a tax notice showing 
payment of $227.68 (Exhibit 3). That obvious discrepancy was 
never explained by Madsens or their attorney until discovery 
proceedings which were initiated after filing of the lawsuit. 
After ~he explanation was made through the discovery proceedings, 
the Andersons tendered $690.93 but the same was refused by the 
Madsens. 
On March 18, 1980, Madsens, through their attorney, 
sent a notice that they were exercising their option under para-
graph 16(a) of the Real Estate Contract and if the "default" 
were not remedied within five days from that date, they would 
declare a forfeiture of Andersons' interest under the Contract. 
Said letter was followed on April 9, 1980, by a Notice to Quit 
under Utah Code Annotated §78-36-3. 
It should be noted that that Madsens have never claimed 
a default in the monthly payments and their only other claim 
was for waste, spoil and destruction, which was not proven at 
trial and there is no finding of fact or conclusion in support 
of waste, spoil or destruction. Indeed, the Andersons made each 
and every installment payment up through the date of trial, 
November, 1981. Consequently, in addition to the $3,000.00 down 
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payment made by the Andersons, they had made monthly payments 
for six years of $143.53 or $10,334.16, for a total of 
$13,334.16. Furthermore, they had made improvements valued at 
$2,380.00. The Judgment below required forfeiture of all such 
payments and forfeiture of any benefit of the their bargain in 
having clear title conveyed to the Andersons upon payment of 
all~installments. The Judgment below also required return of 
the real property to the Madsens upon the condition that Madsens 
pay $1,000.00 for Andersons equitable interest in the property. 
Thus for clearly ascertainable money damages of $690.93, the 
Andersons were penalized a total of $12,334.16, plus $2,380.00 
for improvement costs and a complete loss of the benefit of their 
bargain, that is the property. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING A BREACH WHICH COULD 
TRIGGER A FORFEITURE OF BUYERS' INTEREST AND DENY THEM THE 
BENEFIT OF THEIR BARGAIN. 
The Andersons had faithfully paid each and every 
installment required by the terms of the contract through the 
time of trial and had kept the covenants of the contract for 
over six years and had improved said property at an expense of 
$2,380.00 and had shown every indication by their conduct of 
wanting the benefit of their bargain and a willingness to perform 
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the contract and receive clear title thereto at the end of the 
installment period. 
Paragraph no. 11 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
requires buyers to pay the real property taxes. Paragraph no. 14 
of said contract allows sellers an option if buyers do not pay 
the taxes of doing so themselves and collecting reimbursement 
from buyers. 
Under such provisions, the damages of sellers are 
clearly ascertainable upon their paying the taxes, exercising 
that option under paragraph no. 14 of the contract. In the event 
of buyers failing to reimburse after demand, presumably an action 
could be maintained and a judgment obtained by the sellers with-
out disturbing the other provisions of the contract. (Presumably 
that could be a reason why sellers bargained in advance for the 
option to pay the taxes under paragraph no. 14, so they could 
continue to have the benefit of their bargain of an enforceable 
sale of the property without disturbing the contract or risking 
a loss through a tax sale, and also to protect themselves in 
being able to collect or obtain reimbusement for any amount paid 
by sellers for real property taxes.) 
The exercise of the option to pay the real property 
taxes by sellers gave rise to a cause of action against buyers 
for a clearly ascertainable amount of money damages but did not 
-5-
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trigger a forfeiture of buyers interest in the contract which 
could deprive the buyers of the benefit of the their bargain. 
POINT II 
BUYERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF THEIR BARGAIN WHERE 
THEY HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH PERFORMANCE OF A CON-
TRACT OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME. 
Buyers paid all the installment payments which totalled 
$13,334.16 including the down payment toward a total purchase 
price of $20,000.00 plus 8% interest on the balance of $17,000.00 
over 20 years. Sellers were never in jeopardy of losing their 
interest in the property which they had agreed to sell to buyers. 
Indeed, the sell~rs saw fit to pay the tax for 1976 and 1978 
and didn't notify buyers of the same or demand payment until 
the tax notice for 1979 arrived. 
Sellers, by exercising their option under paragraph 
no. 14 of the contract, have only a right to a claim for money 
damages without disturbing the contract provisions relating to 
any other matter including the obligation to convey clear title 
to the buyers when all installments are paid as the same fall 
due. 
POINT III 
SELLERS WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO CLAIM A FORFEITURE BY EXERCISING 
THEIR OPTION UNDER PARAGRAPH NO. 14 OF THE CONTRACT AND 
FURTHER BY THEIR CONDUCT OF ALLOWING BUYERS TO DEPEND UPON 
-6-
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THEM FOR NOTICE OF THE TAXES DUE AND NOT PROVIDING CLEAR 
PROOF OF AMOUNTS DUE FOR EACH CLAIMED YEAR. 
When buyers were notified of the sum of $690.93 being 
payable for 1976 and 1978 they, through their agent, acted rea-
sonably in asking for proof of payment and upon that request, 
received one cancelled check copy showing $690.93 and one tax 
notice for the year 1976 for $227.68. Such a response was con-
fusing and naturally would invoke further inquiry to determine 
actually what amount was owed. The further inquiry was made, 
but no further explanation was given until after this action 
had been filed and the discovery proceedings produced the explana-
tion. 
The seller or the buyer could have required the County 
Treasurer to forward the tax notice to the buyers or could have 
requested the treasurer to continue to forward the tax notice 
to the sellers. There is no indication that either party made 
a request, but it is apparent that the tax notices for the years 
in question were mailed to the sellers who failed over a period 
of years to let the buyers or their agent know or to make demand 
for payment. 
It is equally clear that the buyers never refused to 
make reimbursement but did request a clarification of the amount 
and for the particular years. 
Sellers allowed the buyers to rely upon them for tax 
notices for the years in question. Sellers also exercised their 
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option under paragraph no. 14 to pay the taxes and seek reimburse· 
ment. By such conduct, sellers waived any right to claim a for-
feiture for a breach of contract based solely upon non-payment 
of taxes for the years in question. 
POINT IV 
IF THE FAILURE TO PAY TAX BY BUYERS, WHICH IS THEN PAID 
BY SELLERS AND REIMBURSEMENT IS REQUESTED, IS CONSIDERED 
A TRIGGERING EVENT REQUIRING A FORFEITURE OF THE INTEREST 
OF BUYERS, THEN THE FORFEITURE PROVISIONS UNDER PARAGRAPH 
NO. 16 OF THE CONTRACT ARE UNENFORCEABLE. 
Under the circumstances of the instant case, to declare 
a forfeiture of the buyers' interest would be unconscionable and 
would be so harsh so as to shock the conscience of a court of 
equity. 
In the instant case, ~he buyers are ordered by the 
trial court to forego the benefit of their bargain of acquiring 
clear title to a parcel of real property including a home and 
lot and are further required to forfeit $13,334.16 in payments 
toward a total purchase price of $20,000.00, and are further 
required to forfeit $2,380.00 in improvement costs, while the 
sellers damages were clearly ascertainable and were only in the 
sum of $690.93. 
Sellers clearly had a cause of action for money damages 
for the sum of $690.93 plus interest, costs and attorney's fees. 
The case of Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d 272, 332 P.2d 989, 
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the court interpreted what it called the spirit of the Perkins 
v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952), page 990, 
It calls for adhesion to a principle that equity 
historically has indulged, that it abhors unconscio-
nability shocking to such a degree that the function 
of equity would be misconceived and misapplied by 
the enforcement of such unconscionability, even 
though it may have been the subject of contract. 
If the conscience of the court is not shocked under 
the circumstances of the lower court's ruling in the instant 
case, it is difficult to imagine a circumstance which would 
invoke a, twinge for the exercise of equity in voiding the enforce-
ability of the forfeiture provisions of a Uniform Real Estate 
Conntract. 
In the case of Jacobsen v. Swan, 13 Utah 2d 59, 278 
P.2d 294, the court spoke of a forfeiture being unconscionable 
and a provision for such unenforceable if, (page 298), 
. it would be so grossly excessive as to be 
entirely disproportionate to any possible loss that 
might have been contemplated, so that a court of 
equity will refuse to enforce the provisions. 
The cases which have stated the principle on the 
enforceability of forfeiture provisions under contract, bargained 
for in advance of any breach, have been concerned in many 
instances with a claim made by a defaulting buyer for the return 
of all payments made after defaulting and showing a willingness 
of giving up the property and no intention of performing the 
contract. In the instant case the buyers clearly wanted the bene-
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fit of their bargain (wanted to continue with the purchase of the 
property). These buyers are perhaps within the definition of 
"necessitous buyers" described in a concurring opinion in Strand 
v. Mayne, 14 Utah 2d 355, 384 P.2d 396 (1963), Page 398. 
POINT V 
FORFEITURE IS AN UNCONSCIONABLE AND UNUSUALLY HARSH REMEDY 
WHERE BUYERS HAD MADE PAYMENTS OF $13,334.16 AND IMPROVE-
MENTS OF $2,380.00 ON A $20,000.00 CONTRACT WHERE DAMAGES 
TOTALLED NO MORE THAN $690.93. 
Paragraph 16(a) of the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
provides that in case of default by the buyers, the sellers may 
elect to rescind the contract and retain all monies received 
as liquidated damages. An alternative remedy, paragraph 16(b), 
allows the seller to bring suit and recover judgment for all 
delinquent payments. Although there is a third remedy, paragraph 
16(c), Madsens' Complaint sought only relief under the first 
two sub portions of paragraph 16. 
In the Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446 (1952), this 
court considered the remedy provided in paragraph 16(a) of the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract and ruled against a harsh and and 
unconscionable application thereof. In that case, the contract 
provided for a purchase price of $10,500.00 with a down payment 
of $2,500.00 and monthly payments of $75.00. The down payment and 
three monthly payments had been made by the buyers when the 
-10-· 
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seller alleged a breach of contract and asked that all payments 
be forfeited as liquidated damages. After the district court 
granted such relief, this court reviewed that decision and 
remanded the case saying, page 449 
It will be observed that in all cases where the 
stipulation for liquidated damages was enforced, 
it has some reasonable relationship to the actual 
damages which could reasonably be anticipated at 
the time the contract was made and was not a for-
feiture which would allow an unconscionable and 
exorbitant recovery. 
Of the forfeiture provisions in such cases, the court 
said, page 450, " . we have uniformly held it to be unenforce-
able." 
In this case the contract provided for a purchase price 
of $20,000.00. In addition to the monthly payments which total 
$10,334.16, the Andersons paid $2,380.00 in needed and reasonable 
improvements. Thus they had paid $15,714.16 by the time the court 
below ruled that possession and ownership of the real property 
should revert to Madsens upon payment by them to Andersons of 
$1,000.00. Since the alleged default amounted to failure to pay 
$690.93 in property taxes, the liquidated damages ordered by the 
court amounting to $14,714.16 was clearly unconscionable and 
exorbitant. 
In the case of Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371 (Utah 
1977)~ this court considered the question of liquidated damages 
and held that payments 34% greater than the actual damages were 
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"grossly excessive" as liquidated damages and, would not be 
enforceable. In the instant case, the amount to be retained by 
the seller is 1787% of the amount of the damages of $690.93. 
The principle set forth in the above cases was 
reaffirmed by this court in 1981 in the case of Morris v. Sykes, 
624 P.2d 681 (Utah 1981). In that case the buyer had paid 
$23,216.00 on a $40,000.00 contract. Upon default, the seller 
sued for forfeiture. The lower court had ordered a forfeiture 
but also required that the seller refund $14,121.00 to the buyer. 
The court held that, (page 684) . 
. . . where a forfeiture under the literal terms 
of a contract results in awarding to a party a sum 
so entirely disproportioned to any damages he may 
have suffered that it shocks the conscience of the 
court, a court of equity will neither approve or 
enforce such a penalty. 
In every case where a forfeiture has been deemed 
unenforceable, the Supreme Court in dealing with its conscience 
. 
was off ended by the fact that in allowing the property to be 
returned to seller, the effect was to impose an unconscionable 
~.;: -~~i ~ 
penalty, whic~ was entirely disproportionate to any damages the 
seller may have suffered. That would clearly be the effect of 
the judgment in the instant case with respect to the Andersons. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case does not justify an interpre-
tation that a default requiring forfeiture was triggered when 
-12-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
sellers paid taxes as was their option under paragraph 14 of 
the contract and reimbursement was sought from buyers. The court 
has stated in Wingets Incorporated v. Bitters, 28 Utah 2d 231, 
500 P.2d 1007 (1972), that when interpreting a contract, the 
court prefers an interpretation which will bring about an equi-
table result over a harsh or inequitable one. 
The evidence in this case does not justify imposing 
a penalty of forfeiture of liquidated damages grossly in excess 
of any actual damage which was incurred by the sellers or which 
could have been contemplated at the time of execution of the 
contract. Unless the forfeiture provision in the instant case 
is declared unenforceable and the trial court decision is 
reversed--clearly the conscience of the court will be shocked 
and results in .succeeding cases will become harsher. 
DATED this 24th day of May, 1982. 
Respectfully submitted, / 
~Rr~~ 
Attorney for Appellant 
420 East South Temple, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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